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Abstract—With the remarkable growth of the Internet and
communication technologies over the past few decades, Inter-
net of Things (IoTs) is enabling the ubiquitous connectivity
of heterogeneous physical devices with software, sensors, and
actuators. IoT networks are naturally two-layer with the cloud
and cellular networks coexisting with the underlaid device-to-
device (D2D) communications. The connectivity of IoTs plays
an important role in information dissemination for mission-
critical and civilian applications. However, IoT communication
networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks including the denial-
of-service (DoS) and jamming attacks, resulting in link removals
in IoT network. In this work, we develop a heterogeneous IoT
network design framework in which a network designer can
add links to provide additional communication paths between
two nodes or secure links against attacks by investing resources.
By anticipating the strategic cyber attacks, we characterize the
optimal design of secure IoT network by first providing a lower
bound on the number of links a secure network requires for a
given budget of protected links, and then developing a method
to construct networks that satisfy the heterogeneous network
design specifications. Therefore, each layer of the designed
heterogeneous IoT network is resistant to a predefined level of
malicious attacks with minimum resources. Finally, we provide
case studies on the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) to
corroborate and illustrate our obtained results.
Index Terms—Optimal Design, Two-Layer Networks, Security,
Connectivity, Internet of Battlefield Things
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoTs) have witnessed a tremendous
development with a variety of applications, such as virtual
reality, intelligent supply chain [1] and smart home [2]. In this
highly connected world, IoT devices are massively deployed
and connected to cellular or cloud networks. For example,
in smart grids, wireless sensors are adopted to collect the
data of buses and power transmission lines. The collected
data can then be sent to a supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) center through cellular networks for
grid monitoring and decision planning purposes. Smart home
is another example of IoT application. Various devices and
appliances in a smart home including air conditioner, lights,
TV, tablets, refrigerator and smart meter are interconnected
through the cloud, improving the quality of the living.
IoT networks can be viewed as multi-layer networks with
the existing infrastructure networks (e.g., cloud and cellular
networks) and the underlaid device networks. The connections
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between different objects in the IoT network can be divided
into two types. Specifically, the communications between
devices themselves are called interlinks, while the devices
communicate with the infrastructure through intralinks. The
connectivity of IoT networks plays an important role in
information dissemination. On the one hand, devices can
communicate directly with other devices in the underlaid
network for local information. On the other hand, devices can
also communicate with the infrastructure networks to maintain
a global situational awareness. In addition, for IoT devices
with insufficient on-board computational resources such as
wearables and drones, they can outsource heavy computations
to the data centers through cloud networks, and hence extend
the battery lifetime. Vehicular network is an illustrative ex-
ample for understanding the two-tier feature of IoT networks
[3]. In an intelligent transportation network, vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) communications enable two vehicles to communicate
and exchange information, e.g., accidents, speed alerts, no-
tifications. In addition, vehicles can also communicate with
roadside infrastructures or units (RSU) that belong to one
or several service providers for exchanging various types of
data related to different applications including GPS navigation,
parking and highway tolls inquiry. In this case, the vehicles
form one network while the infrastructure nodes form another
network. Due to the interconnections between two networks,
vehicles can share information through infrastructure nodes or
by direct V2V communications.
IoT communication networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks
including the denial-of-service (DoS) and jamming attacks [4].
To compromise the communication between two specific de-
vices, the attacker can adopt the selective jamming attack [5],
[6]. More specifically, the attacker selectively targets specific
channels and packets which disrupts the communications by
transmitting a high-range or high-power interference signal.
This adversarial behavior leads to communication link re-
movals in IoT network. Therefore, to maintain the connectivity
of devices, IoT networks need to be secure and resistant to
malicious attacks. For example, V2V communication links of
a car can be jammed, and hence the car loses the real-time
traffic information of the road which may further cause traffic
delays and accidents especially in the futuristic self-driving
applications. Hence, IoT networks should be constructed in
a tactic way by anticipating the cyber attacks. Internet of
Battlefield Things (IoBT) is another example of mission-
critical IoT systems. As depicted in Fig. 1, in IoBT networks,
a team of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) serves as one
layer of wireless relay nodes for a team of unmanned ground
vehicles (UGVs) and soldiers equipped with wearable devices
to communicate between themselves or exchange critical in-
formation with the command-and-control nodes. The UAV
network and the ground network naturally form a two-layer
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Fig. 1: In IoBT networks, a team of UAVs and a group of soldiers and
UGVs execute missions cooperatively. The agents in the battlefield
share critical information through D2D communications. The UAV
network and ground network form a two-layer network which faces
cyber threats, e.g., jamming attacks which can lead to link removals.
network in a battlefield which can be susceptible to jamming
attacks. It is essential to design communication networks that
can allow the IoBT networks to be robust to natural failures
and secure to cyber attacks in order to keep a high-level
situational awareness of agents in a battlefield.
Due to heterogeneous and multi-tier features of the IoT
networks, the required security levels can vary for different
networks. For example, in IoBT networks, the connectivity of
UAV networks requires a higher security level than the ground
network if the UAVs are more likely to be targeted by the
adversary. Similarly, in vehicular networks, the communica-
tion links between RSUs need a high-level protection when
they anticipate more attacks than the vehicles do. Therefore,
it is imperative to design secure IoT networks resistant to
link attacks and maintain the two-layer network connectivity
with heterogeneous security requirements simultaneously. To
this end, we present a heterogeneous IoT network design
framework in which network links are vulnerable to malicious
attacks. To enhance the security and the robustness of the
network, an IoT network designer can add extra links to
provide additional communication paths between two nodes or
secure links against failures by investing resources to protect
the links. To allocate links, note that when the nodes in the IoT
network are within a short distance, then the classical wireless
communication technologies can be adopted including WiFi,
Bluetooth, and Zigbee. In comparison, when the distance is
large, then one option that has recently emerged is called ultra
narrow band (UNB) [7] that uses the random frequency and
time multiple access [8]. The UNB is dedicated for mission-
critical IoT systems for providing reliable communication
services in long range. The goal of the multi-tier network
design is to make the network connectivity resistant to link
removal attacks by anticipating the worst attack behaviors.
Different from previous works [9], [10] which have focused
on the secure design of single-layer networks, in our current
work, the network designer needs to take into account the
heterogeneous features of the IoT networks by imposing
different security requirements on each layer which presents
a new set of challenges for network design.
In this paper, we focus on a two-layer IoT network and
aim to design each network resistant to different number of
link failures with minimum resources. We characterize the
optimal strategy of the secure network design problem by first
developing a lower bound on the number of links a secure
network requires for a given budget of protected links. Then,
we provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which
the bounds are achieved and present a method to construct
an optimal network that satisfies the heterogeneous network
design specifications with the minimum cost. Furthermore, we
characterize the robust network topologies which optimally
satisfy a class of security requirements. These robust optimal
networks are applicable to the cases when the cyber threats
are not perfectly perceived or change dynamically, typically
happening in the mission-critical scenarios when the attacker’s
action is partially observable.
Finally, we use IoBT as a case study to illustrate the analyt-
ical results and obtain insights in designing secure networks.
We consider a mission-critical battlefield scenario in which the
UAV network anticipates higher cyber threats than the soldier
network, and the number of UAVs is less than the number of
soldiers. We observe that as the cost of forming a protected
communication link becomes smaller, more secure connections
are formed in the optimal IoBT network. In addition, the
designed network is resilient to the change of agents in the
battlefield. We also study the reconfiguration and resilience of
the UAV network as nodes leave and join the battlefield.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
1) We propose a two-layer heterogeneous framework for
IoT networks consisting of various devices, where each
layer network faces different levels of cyber threats.
2) By utilizing the tools from graph theory and optimiza-
tion, we analyze the lower bounds of the number of
required links for the IoT network being connected by
anticipating the worst case attacks.
3) We derive optimal strategies for creating secure two-
layer IoT networks with heterogeneous security require-
ments and provide their construction guidelines under
different regimes in terms of threat levels and number
of nodes. We also identify the robust optimal strategies
for the IoT network with dynamic cyber threat levels.
4) We apply the optimal design principles to crucial IoBT
scenarios and provide insights into the design of secure
and resilient interdependent UAV and soldier networks
in the IoBT.
A. Related Work
Due to the increasing cyber threats, IoT security becomes a
critical concern nowadays [11]. Depending on the potential
of cyber attackers, IoT networks face heterogeneous types
of attacks [12]. For example, attackers can target the edge
computing nodes in IoT, e.g., RFID readers and sensor nodes.
Some typical adversarial scenarios include the node replication
attack by replicating one node’s identification number [13],
DoS by battery draining, sleep deprivation, and outage attacks
[14], [15]. The attackers can also launch attacks through the
IoT communication networks. Quintessential examples include
the eavesdropping attack where the attacker captures the pri-
vate information over the channel, and utilizes the information
to design other tailored attacks [16]. Another example is the
data injection attack where the attacker can inject fraudu-
lent packets into IoT communication links through insertion,
manipulation, and replay techniques [17]. In our work, we
focus on the jamming and DoS attacks which lead to the link
removal in IoT communication networks.
To mitigate the cyber threats in IoT, a large number of
works have focused on addressing the security issues by using
different methodologies [4]. A contract-theoretic approach has
been adopted to guarantee the performance of security services
in the Internet of controlled things [18], [19] and mitigate the
systemic cyber risks [20]. The authors in [21] have proposed
a media-aware security architecture for facilitating multimedia
applications in the IoT. [22] has proposed a dynamic game
model including pre-attack defense and post-attack recovery
phases in designing resilient IoT-enabled infrastructure net-
works. Strategic security investment under bounded rationality
in IoT has been studied in [23], [24]. The authors in [25]
have developed an interdependent strategic trust mechanism
to defend against cyber attacks in IoT.
In this work, we investigate the secure design of IoT net-
work by considering its connectivity measure [9], [10], [26],
[27] through the lens of graph theory [28]. Comparing with the
previous works [9], [10] that have focused on a single-layer
adversarial network design, we model the IoT as a two-layer
network and strategically design each layer of the network
with heterogeneous security requirements. The current work is
also related to the secure and resilient interdependent critical
infrastructures [29]–[33] in which a holistic design approach
is required.
B. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
formulates the heterogeneous two-layer IoT network design
framework. Analytical results including the lower bounds of
links and optimal IoT network design strategies are presented
in Section III. Case studies of IoBT networks are provided in
Section IV, and Section V concludes the paper.
II. HETEROGENEOUS TWO-LAYER IOT NETWORK
DESIGN FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate a two-layer secure IoT network
design problem. Due to the heterogeneous features of IoT
networks, the devices at each layer face different levels of
cyber threats. To maintain the global situational awareness, the
designer aims to devise an IoT network with a minimum cost,
where each layer of IoT network should remain connected in
the presence of a certain level of adversarial attacks.
Specifically, we model the two-layer IoT network with two
sets of devices or nodes1 denoted by S1 and S2. Each set of
nodes is of a different type. Specifically, denote by n1 := |S1|
1Nodes and vertices in the IoT network refer to the devices, and they are
used interchangeably. Similar for the terms edges and links.
and n2 := |S2| the number of nodes of type 1 and 2,
respectively, where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. We
unify them to n = n1 +n2 vertices that are numbered from 1
to n starting from nodes in S1. Thus, a node labeled i is of type
1 if and only if i ≤ n1. Note that each set of nodes forms an
IoT subnetwork. Together with the interconnections between
two sets of nodes, the subnetworks form a two-layer IoT
network. Technically, the communication protocols between
nodes within and across different layers can be either the
same or heterogeneous depending on the adopted technology
by considering the physical distance constraints. Furthermore,
the nodes’ functionality can be different in two subnetworks
depending on their specific tasks. In this paper, our focus lies
in the high-level of network connectivity maintenance.
In standard graph theory, an edge (or a link) is an un-
ordered pair of vertices: (i, j) ∈ J1, nK2, i 6= j, whereJ1, nK2 is a set including all the pairs of integers between
1 and n. We recall that two vertices (nodes) i0 and iL
are said connected in a graph of nodes S1 ∪ S2 and a
set of edges E if there exists a path between them, i.e.,
a finite alternating sequence of nodes and distinct links:
i0, (i0, i1), i1, (i1, i2), i2, ..., (iL−1, iL), iL, where il ∈ S1 ∪
S2 and (il−1, il) ∈ E for all 1 ≤ l ≤ L.
In our IoT networks, the communication links (edges) are
vulnerable to malicious attacks, e.g., jamming and DoS, which
result in link removals. To keep the IoT network resistant to
cyber attacks, the network designer can either invest (i) in
redundancy of the path, i.e., using extra links so that two nodes
can communicate through different paths, or (ii) in securing
its links against failures where we refer to these special
communication edges as protected links. These protected links
can be typically designed using moving target defense (MTD)
strategies, where the designer randomizes the usage of commu-
nication links among multiple created channels between two
nodes [34]. More precisely, we consider that for the designer,
the cost per non-protected link created is cNP and the cost per
protected link created is cP . It is natural to have cNP ≤ cP
since creation of a protected link is more costly than that of
a non-protected one. For clarity, we assume that the costs of
protected or non-protected links at two different layers are
the same. If the costs of creating links are different in two
subnetworks, then the network designer needs to capture this
link creation difference in his objective [35]. Let ENP ⊆ E
be the set of non-protected links and EP ⊆ E be the set of
protected links in the IoT network, and ENP ∪ EP = E . In
this work, we assume that the protection is perfect, i.e., links
will not fail under attacks if they are protected. Therefore,
an adversary does not have an incentive to attack protected
links. Denote the strategy of the attacker by EA, then it is
sufficient to consider attacks on a set of links EA ⊆ ENP .
Furthermore, we assume that the network designer can allocate
links between any nodes in the network. In the scenarios that
setting up communication links between some nodes is not
possible, then the network designer needs to take into account
this factor as constraints when designing networks.
The heterogeneous features of IoT networks naturally lead
to various security requirements for devices in each sub-
network. Hence, we further consider that the nodes in IoT
network have different criticality levels (k1 and k2 for nodes
of type 1 and 2, respectively, with k1, k2 ∈ J0, |ENP |K, whereJa, bK denotes a set of integers between a and b). It means
that subnetworks 1 and 2 should remain connected after the
compromise of any k1 and k2 links in ENP , respectively.
Thus, the designer needs to prepare for the worst case of link
removal attacks when designing the two-layer IoT network.
Our problem is beyond the robust network design where the
link communication breakdown is generally caused by nature
failures. In this paper, we consider the link removal which is a
consequence of cyber attacks, e.g., jamming and DoS attack.
Furthermore, in our problem formulation, the network designer
can allocate protected links which can be seen as a security
practice, and he takes into account the strategic behavior of
attackers, and designs the optimal secure networks. Without
loss of generality, we have the following two assumptions:
(A1) k1 ≤ k2.
(A2) n1 ≥ 1, n2 ≥ 1.
Specifically, (A1) indicates that the IoT devices in subnetwork
2 are relatively more important than those in subnetwork 1, and
thus subnetwork 2 should be more resistant to cyber attacks.
Another interpretation of (A1) can also be that subnetwork 2
faces a higher level of cyber threats, and the network designer
needs to prepare a higher security level for subnetwork 2. In
addition, (A2) ensures that no IoT subnetwork is empty.
More precisely, consider a set of vertices S1∪S2 and edges
EP ∪ ENP . The IoT network designer needs to guarantee the
following two cases:
(a) if |EA| ≤ k1, then all nodes remain attainable in the
presence of attacks, i.e., ∀i, j ∈ S1 ∪ S2, there exists
a path in the graph (S1 ∪ S2, EP ∪ ENP \EA) between i
and j.
(b) if |EA| ≤ k2, nodes of type 2 remain attainable after
attacks, i.e., ∀i, j ∈ S2, there exists a path in the graph
(S1 ∪ S2, EP ∪ ENP \EA) between i and j.
Remark: We denote the designed network satisfying (a) and
(b) above by sD := (S1∪S2, EP ∪ENP ), and call such hetero-
geneous IoT networks (k1, k2)-resistant (with k1 ≤ k2). The
proposed (k1, k2)-resistant metric provides a flexible network
design guideline by specifying various security requirements
on different network components. Furthermore, in this work,
we care about each node’s degree which requires an explicit
agent-level quantification. Then, the (k1, k2)-resistant metric is
more preferable than measure of the proportion of links in each
subnetwork, where the latter metric only gives a macroscopic
description of the link allocation over two subnetworks.
Given the system’s parameters S1, S2, k1, and k2, an
optimal strategy for the IoT network designer is the choice
of a set of links EP ∪ ENP which solves the optimization
problem:
min
EP ,ENP
cp|EP |+ cNP |ENP |
s.t. EP ⊆ J1, nK2, ENP ⊆ J1, nK2,
EP ∩ ENP = ∅,
sD = (S1 ∪ S2, EP ∪ ENP ) is (k1, k2)−resistant.
From the above optimization problem, the optimal network
design cost directly depends on cP and cNP . In addition, as
we will analyze in Section III, the cost ratio cPcNP plays a
critical role in the optimal strategy design.
Under the optimal design strategy, compromising a node
with low degree, i.e., k1 degree in subnetwork 1 and k2 degree
in subnetwork 2, is not feasible for the attacker, since the
degree of any nodes without protected link in the network is
larger than k1 or k2 depending on the nodes’ layers.
Note that the above designer’s constrained optimization
problem is not straightforward to solve. First, the size of search
space increases exponentially as the number of nodes in the
IoT network grows. Therefore, we need to find a scalable
method to address the optimal network design. Second, the
heterogeneous security requirements make the problem more
difficult to solve. On the one hand, two subnetworks are
separate since they have their own design standards. On the
other hand, we should tackle these two layers of network
design in a holistic fashion due to their natural couplings.
III. ANALYTICAL RESULTS AND OPTIMAL IOT NETWORK
DESIGN
In this section, we provide an analytical study of the
designer’s optimal strategy, i.e., the optimal two-layer IoT
network design.
We first develop, for given system parameters S1, S2, k1,
k2, cP and cNP , and for each possible number of protected
links p = |EP |, a lower bound on the number of non-protected
links that have any (k1, k2)-resistant network with p protected
links (Section III-A). Then, we study three important cases,
namely when p takes values 0, n2 − 1 and n1 + n2 − 1, and
present for each of them sufficient conditions under which
the lower bounds are attained (Section III-B). Based on this
study, we can obtain the main theoretical results of this paper,
which include the optimal strategy for the designer, i.e., a
(k1, k2)-resistant IoT network with the minimal cost, as well
as the robust optimal strategy, and constructive methods of an
optimal IoT network (Section III-C).
A. A Lower Bound on the Number of (Non-Protected) Links
Recall that the system parameters are S1, S2, k1, k2, cP
and cNP (corresponding to the set of nodes of criticality level
1 and 2, the values of criticality, and the unitary cost of
creating protected and non-protected links). We first address
the question of a lower bound on the cost for the designer
with an additional constraint on the number of protected links
p in the network. Since the cost is linear with the number
of non-protected links, it amounts to finding a lower bound
on the number of non-protected links that are required in any
(k1, k2)-resistant network with p protected links.
Let s˜Dp be a (k1, k2)-resistant network containing p pro-
tected links. Then, we have the following proposition on the
lower bound |ENP |.
Proposition 1 (Lower bound on |ENP |). The number of non-
protected links of s˜Dp is at least of
(i)
n1(k1 + 1) + (n2 − p)(k2 + 1)
2
, if 0 ≤ p ≤ n2 − 2,
(ii)
(n− p)(k1 + 1)
2
, if n2 − 1 ≤ p ≤ n1 + n2 − 2,
Lower bound on the number of non-protected links
p
0 n2 − 2
n1(k1+1)+n2(k2+1)
2
A
Bn1(k1+1)+2(k2+1)
2
n2 − 1
C(n1+1)(k1+1)
2
n1 + n2 − 2
D
E
k1 + 1
n1 + n2 − 1
Slope k2+12
Slope (k2+1)+(k2−k1)2
Slope k1+12
Slope k1 + 1
Fig. 2: Lower bound on the number of non-protected links as a function on the number of protected links in the IoT network. Note that all
the slopes of lines are quantified in their absolute value sense for convenience.
(iii) 0, if p = n1 + n2 − 1.
Note that p takes integer values in each regime. The results
are further illustrated in Fig. 2.
Before proving Proposition 1, we first present the notion of
network contraction in the following.
Network Contraction: Let g = (S1 ∪ S2, EP ∪ ENP ) be a
network. Given a link (i, j) ∈ EP , the network denoted by
g  (i, j) refers to the one obtained by contracting the link
(i, j); i.e., by merging the two nodes i and j into a single
node {i, j} (supernode). Note that any node a is adjacent to
the (new) node {i, j} in g(i, j) if and only if a is adjacent to
i or j in the original network g. In other words, all links, other
than those incident to neither i nor j, are links of g  (i, j)
if and only if they are links of g. Then gˆ, the contraction of
network g, is the (uniquely defined) network obtained from g
by sequences of link contractions for all links in EP [10].
For clarity, we illustrate the contraction of a network g in
Fig. 3. This example consists of 5 nodes and 2 protected links
(represented in bold lines between nodes 1 and 2 and between
nodes 3 and 4). The link (1, 2) is contracted and thus both
nodes 1 and 2 in g are merged into a single node denoted by
{1, 2} in gˆ. Similarly the link (3, 4) is contracted. The resulting
network thus consists of node 5 and supernodes {1, 2} and
{3, 4}. Since g contains a link between nodes 5 and 1 in
g, then nodes 5 and {1, 2} are connected through a link in
network gˆ. Similarly, since nodes 1 and 3 are adjacent in g,
then supernodes {1, 2} and {3, 4} are adjacent in network gˆ.
Based on network contraction, we present the proof of
Proposition 1 as follows.
Proof. Consider an IoT network g including p protected links,
and gˆ as its contraction. Let
(1) ν1 be the number of nodes of type 1 in gˆ (and supernodes
containing only nodes of type 1),
(2) ν2 be the number of nodes of type 2 in gˆ (and supernodes
containing only nodes of type 2),
5
1 2
3 4
(a) Network g = (N, EP ∪ ENP )
5
{1, 2}
{3, 4}
(b) Contraction net-
work gˆ
Fig. 3: Illustration of network contraction. The protected links (1, 2)
and (3, 4) in network g are contracted in network gˆ.
(3) ν0 be the number of supernodes in gˆ that contains nodes
of both type 1 and 2.
Note that if ν1 + ν2 + ν0 = 1, (i.e., if there is a unique
supernode containing all nodes of the network), then no non-
protected link is needed to ensure any level of (k1, k2)-
resistancy. Otherwise, for the IoT network to be (k1, k2)-
resistant, each element of ν1, ν2 and ν0 must have a degree of
(at least) k1 + 1. Further, if there exist more than one element
not in ν1; i.e., if ν0 + ν2 ≥ 2, then each of them should have
a degree of (at least) k2 + 1.
Thus, a lower bound on the number of non-protected links
in s˜Dp is
Φ =

ν1(k1 + 1) + (ν0 + ν2)(k2 + 1)
2
, if ν2 + ν0 > 1,
0, if ν1 + ν2 + ν0 = 1,
(ν1 + 1)(k1 + 1)
2
, if ν1 ≥ 1 and ν2 + ν0 = 1.
Next, we focus on the study of parameters ν0, ν1 and ν2. If
no protected link is used, i.e., p = 0, then ν1 = n1, ν2 = n2
and ν0 = 0 and ν0 + ν1 + ν2 = n1 + n2 = n. Adding any
protection allows to decrease the total number of elements
ν1 + ν2 + ν0 by 1 (or to remain constant if the link induce a
loop in a protected component of g). Thus ν0+ν1+ν2 ≥ n−p.
Similarly, for each subnetwork, we have ν0 +ν1 ≥ n1−p and
ν0 + ν2 ≥ n2 − p. Further, the number of elements of ν1
and ν2 are upper bounded by the number of nodes of type 1
n1 and type 2 n2, respectively, i.e., ν1 ≤ n1 and ν2 ≤ n2.
Finally, since n1 ≥ 1 then ν1 +ν0 ≥ 1, and since n2 ≥ 1 then
ν2 + ν0 ≥ 1. Thus, for any p, a lower bound on the number
of non-protected links in s˜Dp can be obtained by solving the
following optimization problem:
min
ν1,ν2,ν0
Φ
s.t. ν0 + ν1 + ν2 ≥ n− p,
ν0 + ν1 ≥ n1 − p, ν0 + ν2 ≥ n2 − p,
ν1 ≤ n1, ν2 ≤ n2,
ν1 + ν0 ≥ 1, ν2 + ν0 ≥ 1.
(1)
To solve this optimization problem, we consider three cases.
Case 1: First, assume that p < n2 − 1. From ν0 + ν1 +
ν2 ≥ n− p, we obtain that ν0 + ν2 > 1. Thus, (1) reduces to
minν1,ν2,ν0
ν1(k1+1)+(ν0+ν2)(k2+1)
2 with the same constraints
as in (1) except ν0 + ν2 > 1.
Since k2 ≥ k1, then the minimum of the objective is
obtained when ν0 +ν2 is minimized, i.e., when all protections
involve nodes of type 2. Then, ν0 + ν2 = n2 − p. Thus, the
lower bound is equal to n1(k1+1)+(n2−p)(k2+1)2 . This result is
illustrated by the line joining points A and B in Fig. 2.
Case 2: Assume that n2 − 1 ≤ p ≤ n1 + n2 − 2. Then
n − p ≤ n1 + 1. Therefore, for a given p, i.e., for a given
minimal value of ν0 +ν1 +ν2, we can have either ν0 +ν2 > 1
or ν0 + ν2 = 1. Then, the lower bound of the number of non-
protected links is min
{
n1(k1+1)+(n2−p)(k2+1)
2 ,
(n−p)(k1+1)
2
}
.
Recall that k2 ≥ k1, and therefore the lower bound achieves
at (n−p)(k1+1)2 . This observation is illustrated by the line in
Fig. 2 joining points C and D.
Case 3: Finally, when p = n − 1, ν0 + ν1 + ν2 = 1, and
thus no non-protected link is needed, which is represented by
point E in Fig. 2. 
Based on Proposition 1, we further comment on the loca-
tions where protected and non-protected links are placed in
the two-layer IoT networks.
Corollary 1. When 0 ≤ p ≤ n2−2, the protected links purely
exist in subnetwork 2. When n2 − 1 ≤ p ≤ n1 + n2 − 2,
subnetwork 2 only contains protected links, and non-protected
links appear in subnetwork 1 or between two layers. When
p = n1 + n2 − 1, then all nodes in the two-layer IoT network
are connected with protected links.
Corollary 1 has a natural interpretation that the protected
link resources are prior to be allocated to a subnetwork facing
higher cyber threats, i.e., subnetwork 2 in our setting.
B. Networks with Special Values of p Protected Links
In the previous Section III-A, we have studied for each
potential number of protected links p, a lower bound m(p)
on the minimum number of non-protected links for an IoT
network with sets of nodes S1 and S2 being (k1, k2)-resistant.
Then, the cost associated with such networks is
C(p,m(p)) = pcP +m(p)cNP ,
Fig. 4: Illustration of Harary networks with different number of
nodes and security levels.
where C : N × N → R+. Since the goal of the designer is
to minimize its cost, we need to investigate the value of p
minimizing such function C(p,m(p)).
In Fig. 2, we note that the plot of a network of equal cost
(iso-cost) K is a line of equation K−pcPcNP . It is thus a line
of (negative) slope cP /cNP that crosses the y-axis at point
K/cNP . Recall also that the graph that shows m(p) as a
function of p is on the upper-right quadrant of its lower bound.
Thus, the optimal value of p corresponds to the point where an
iso-cost line meets the graph m(p) for the minimal value K.
From the shape of the lower bound drawn in Fig. 2, the points
A, C and E are selected candidates leading to the optimal
network construction cost. We thus investigate in the following
the condition under which the lower bounds are reached at
these critical points as well as the corresponding configuration
of the optimal two-layer IoT networks.
Remark: Denote by sDp a (k1, k2)-resistant IoT network
with p protected links and the minimum number of non-
protected links.
Before presenting the result, we first present the definition
of Harary network in the following. Recall that for a network
containing n nodes being resistant to k link attacks, one
necessary condition is that each node should have a degree
of at least k + 1, yielding the total number of links more
than
⌈
(k+1)n
2
⌉
. Here, d·e denotes the ceiling operator. Harary
network below can achieve this bound.
Definition 1 (Harary Network [36]). In a network containing
n nodes, Harary network is the optimal design that uses the
minimum number of links equaling
⌈
(k+1)n
2
⌉
for the network
still being connected after removing any k links.
The constructive method of general Harary network can
be described with cycles as follows. It first creates the links
between node i and node j such that (|i − j| mod n) = 1,
and then (|i − j| mod n) = 2, etc. When the number of
nodes is odd, then the last cycle of link creation is slightly
different since (k+1)n2 is not an integer. However, the bound⌈
(k+1)n
2
⌉
can be still be achieved. For clarity, we illustrate
three cases in Fig. 4 with n = 5, 7 under different security
levels k = 2, 3. Since Harary network achieves the bound⌈
(k+1)n
2
⌉
, its computational cost of the construction is linear
in both the number of nodes n and the security level k.
Then, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. For the number of protected links p taking
values of n− 1, n2 − 1, and 0, we successively have:
(i) each sDn−1 contains exactly 0 non-protected link.
(ii) each sDn2−1 contains exactly
⌈
(n1+1)(k1+1)
2
⌉
non-
protected links if and only if k1 + 1 ≤ n1.
(iii) if we have the following asumptions: (i) k1 mod 2 = 1,
where mod denotes the modulus operator, (ii) n2 >
k2 − k1 and (iii) n2 k1+12 ≤ n1, then each sD0 contains
exactly
⌈
n1(k1 + 1) + n2(k2 + 1)
2
⌉
non-protected links.
Proof. We successively prove the three items in the proposi-
tion in the following.
(i) Note that sDn−1 contains exactly p = n − 1 protected
links. It is thus possible to construct a tree network among
the set S1 ∪ S2 of nodes that consists of only protected links.
Thus, no non-protected link is required, and the lower bound
(point E in Fig. 2) can be reached.
(ii) Suppose that p = n2 − 1. If k1 + 1 ≤ n1, we can
construct any tree protected network on the nodes of S2.
Further, construct a (k1 + 1)-Harary network on the nodes of
S1∪{n1+1}, that is the nodes of type 1 and one node of type
2. Such construction is possible since k1+2 ≤ n1+1. The total
number of non-protected links is then exactly
⌈
(n1+1)(k1+1)
2
⌉
(point C in Fig. 2). Therefore, each node in S1 ∪ {n1 + 1}
is connected to k1 + 1 other nodes, and the IoT network
cannot be disconnected after removing k1 non-protected links.
In addition, the subnetwork 2 is resistant to any number of
attack since it is constructed using all protected links. Note
that the constructed Harary network here is optimal, in the
sense that its configuration uses the least number of links for
the IoT network being (k1, k2)-resistant.
Next, if k1+1 > n1, then suppose that a network g achieves
the lower bound
⌈
(n1+1)(k1+1)
2
⌉
. Consider its associated con-
tracted network gˆ. Since g contains n2 − 1 protected links,
then gˆ is such that ν0 + ν1 + ν2 ≥ n1 + 1. From the shape
of the lower bound Φ in the proof of Proposition 1, then
necessarily ν0 + ν2 = 1 and ν1 = n1. Thus, all nodes in
S2 need to be connected together by protected links. Since
|S2| = n2, then it requires at least n2 − 1 protected links,
which equals p. Thus, there cannot be any protected link
involving nodes in set S1. In addition, each node in S1 needs
to be connected to at least k1 + 1 other nodes in the IoT
network. Since k1 + 1 > n1, then every node in S1 should
connect to at least (k1 + 1) − (n1 − 1) ≥ 2 number of
nodes in S2. Recall that in a complete network of m nodes,
each node has a degree of m − 1, and the total number of
links is m(m−1)2 . Hence, our IoT network admits a completed
graph in S1 with some extra n1((k1 + 1) − (n1 − 1)) non-
protected links between two subnetworks, and in total at least
n1(n1−1)
2 + n1((k1 + 1)− (n1− 1)) = n1(k1 + 1)− n1(n1−1)2
non-protected links. Then, comparing with the lower bound,
the extra number of links required is n1(k1 + 1)− n1(n1−1)2 −
(n1+1)(k1+1)
2 =
n1−1
2 (k1 +1−n1) > 0. Thus, sDn2−1 does not
achieve the lower bound (point C in Fig. 2) when k1+1 > n1.
(iii) Finally, suppose that p = 0. We renumber the
nodes in the network according to the following se-
quence: 1, 2, · · · , k1+12 , n2, k1+12 +1, · · · , k1 +1, n2 + 1, k1 +
2, · · · , 3k1+12 , n2 + 2, · · · . Intuitively, we interpose one node
in S2 after every k1+12 nodes in S1. Then, we first build a
(k1 + 1)-Harary network among all the nodes in S1 and S2.
Note that since n2 k2+12 ≤ n1, then the last k1+12 indices of the
sequence only contain nodes of type 1. Thus, by construction,
there are no links between any two nodes in S2. Then, we can
further construct a (k2 − k1)-Harary network on the nodes in
S2, which is possible since n2 > k2−k1. Thus, the constructed
IoT network is (k1, k2)-resistant, and it is also optimal since
it uses the minimum number of non-protected links. 
Proposition 2 and Fig. 2 indicate that depending on the
system parameters (k1, k2, n1, n2) and for a given budget, the
optimal IoT network can achieve at either point A, C or E
with p = 0, n2 − 1, n− 1 protected links, respectively. Notice
that when k1 + 1 > n1, sDn2−1 is not optimal at point C and
the lower bound on the number of non-protected links is not
attained. Instead, in this case, sDn2−1 requires
n1(2k1−n1+3)
2
non-protected links in which n1(k1 − n1 + 2) are allocated
between two subnetworks, introducing protection redundancy
for nodes in S2. For the IoT network containing 0 protected
link, it reaches the lower bound (point A) if we can construct
a (k1 + 1)-Harary network for all nodes and an additional
(k2−k1)-Harary network for nodes only in S2. As mentioned
before, the Harary network admits an optimal configuration
with the maximum connectivity given a number of links [36].
C. Optimal Strategy and Construction of IoT Networks
We investigate the optimal strategy and the corresponding
construction for the IoT network designer in this section.
1) Optimal Strategy: Before presenting the main result, we
comment on the scenarios that we aim to study regarding the
IoT networks.
(1) First, the number of nodes is relatively large comparing
with the link failure risks, i.e., n1 ≥ k1 + 1 and n2 ≥
k2 − k1 + 1. Indeed, these two conditions indicate that
the designer can create a secure two-layer IoT network
solely using non-protected links.
(2) We further have the condition n2 k1+12 ≤ n1, indicating
that the type 2 nodes with higher criticality levels in S2
constitute a relatively small portion in the IoT network
comparing with these in S1. This condition also aligns
with the practice that the attacker has preferences on the
nodes to compromise in the IoT which generally only
contain a small subset of the entire network.
(3) Finally, we have constraints k1 mod 2 = 1 and n2(k2 +
1) mod 2 = 0 which are only used to simplify the
presentation of the paper (whether the number of nodes
and attacks is odd or even). However, they do not affect
the results significantly. Note that different cases corre-
sponding to k1 mod 2 = 0 or n2(k2 + 1) mod 2 = 1
can be studied in a similar fashion as in our current
context. The only difference is that for certain system
parameters, sD0 is not an optimal strategy comparing with
sDn2−1 by following a similar analysis in [10].
Therefore, based on the above conditions, the scenarios that
we analyze are quite general and conform with the situations
in the adversarial IoT networks. Based on Proposition 2, we
then obtain the following result on the optimal design of secure
two-layer IoT networks. Note that the solution in Proposition
3 is optimal to the original optimization problem presented in
Section II under the considered scenarios.
Proposition 3. Under the conditions that n1 ≥ k1 + 1, n2 ≥
k2 − k1 + 1, n2 k1+12 ≤ n1, k1 mod 2 = 1 and n2(k2 + 1)
mod 2 = 0, we have the following results:
I) Regime I: if 1 + k1 − n(k2 − k1) ≤ 0, then:
(1) if 2 cPcNP ≥ k2 + 1 + k2−k1n2−1 , then sD0 are optimal
strategies.
(2) if k1 + 1 + k1+1n1 ≤ 2 cPcNP < k2 + 1 + k2−k1n2−1 , then
sDn2−1 are optimal strategies.
(3) if 2 cPcNP < k1 + 1 +
k1+1
n1
, then sDn−1 are optimal
strategies.
II) Regime II: if 1 + k1 − n(k2 − k1) > 0, then:
(1) when k2 − k1 + 1 ≤ n2 < 1+k11+k1−n1(k2−k1) , the
optimal IoT network design strategies are the same
as those in regime I.
(2) otherwise, i.e., n2 ≥ 1+k11+k1−n1(k2−k1) , we obtain
(i) if 2 cPcNP ≥
n1(k1+1)+n2(k2+1)
n1+n2−1 , then s
D
0 are opti-
mal strategies.
(ii) if 2 cPcNP <
n1(k1+1)+n2(k2+1)
n1+n2−1 , then s
D
n−1 are
optimal strategies.
Thus, sDn2−1 cannot be optimal in this scenario.
Proof. From Proposition 2 and under the assumptions in the
current proposition, sD0 , s
D
n2−1 and s
D
n−1 achieve the lower
bounds of the number of links for the network being (k1, k2)-
resistant. In Fig. 2, note that the slope of the line between
points A and C is 12 (k2 + 1 +
k2−k1
n2−1 ), and between points C
and E is 12 (k1 + 1 +
k1+1
n1
), where we quantify the slopes in
their absolute value sense.
In regime I, i.e., 1 + k1−n(k2− k1) ≤ 0, we obtain (k2 +
k2−k1
n2−1 ) − (k1 + k1+1n1 ) ≤ 0, yielding that the line connecting
points A and C has a higher slope than the one joining points
C and E. Thus, if the lines of iso-costs have a slope higher than
the slope of the line A-C, then the minimum cost is obtained
at point A. Similarly, if the slope is less than that of line C-E,
then the minimum cost is obtained at point E. Otherwise, the
minimum is obtained at point C. Recall that the slope of the
lines of iso-costs is equal to cP /cNP which leading to the
result.
In the other regime II, i.e., 1 + k1 − n(k2 − k1) > 0, the
slope of line A-C is not always greater than that of line C-
E. Specifically, we obtain a threshold n2 = 1+k11+k1−n1(k2−k1)
over which the slop of line C-E is greater than line A-C.
Therefore, if n2 < 1+k11+k1−n1(k2−k1) , the optimal network
design is the same as those in regime I. In addition, when
n2 ≥ 1+k11+k1−n1(k2−k1) , and if the slop of iso-costs lines, i.e.,
cP /cNP , is larger than the slope of the line connecting points
A and E, the minimum cost is achieved at point A. Otherwise,
if cP /cNP is smaller than the slop of line A-E, the optimal
network configuration is obtained at point E. 
From Proposition 3, we can conclude that in regime I, i.e.,
1+k1−n(k2−k1) ≤ 0, when the unit cost of protected links is
relatively larger than the non-protected ones, then the secure
IoT networks admit an sD0 strategy using all non-protected
links. In comparison, the secure IoT networks are constructed
with solely protected links when the cost per protected link is
relatively small satisfying cP < (k1 + 1 + k1+1n1 )cNP /2. Note
that the optimal network design strategy in this regime can
be achieved by protecting the minimum spanning tree for a
connected network. Equivalently speaking, finding a spanning
tree method provides an algorithmic approach to construct the
optimal network in this regime. Finally, when the cost per
protected link is intermediate, the network designer allocates
n2 − 1 protected links connecting those critical nodes in set
S2 while uses non-protected links to connect the nodes in S1.
In addition, the intralinks between two subnetworks are non-
protected ones.
Note that the specific configuration of the optimal IoT
network is not unique according to Proposition 3. To enhance
the system reliability and efficiency, the network designer can
choose the one among all the optimal topology that minimize
the communication distance between devices.
Since the cyber threat in subnetwork 2 is more severe than
that in subnetwork 1, i.e., k2 ≥ k1, thus the condition of
regime II in Proposition 3 (1 + k1 − n(k2 − k1) > 0) is not
generally satisfied. We further have the following Corollary
refining the result of optimal IoT network design in regime II.
Corollary 2. Only when two subnetworks facing the same
level of cyber threats, i.e., k1 = k2, the optimal IoT network
design follows the strategies in regime II. Moreover, sDn2−1
cannot be an optimal network design in regime II.
Proof. Based on the condition n1 ≥ k1+1, we obtain 1+k1−
(n1 + n2)(k2 − k1) ≤ n1 − (n1 + n2)(k2 − k1). Thus, when
k2 > k1, the condition of regime II (1 +k1−n(k2−k1) > 0)
cannot be satisfied. Since k2 ≥ k1, then only k1 = k2 yields
1 + k1 > 0. Therefore, n2 ≥ 1+k11+k1−n1(k2−k1) = 1 always
holds which leads to the result. 
We then simplify the conditions leading to regime I and II
as follows.
Corollary 3. The IoT network design can be divided into two
regimes according to the cyber threat levels. Specifically, when
k2 > k1, the optimal design strategy follows the one in regime
I in Proposition 3, and otherwise (k1 = k2) follows the one
in regime II.
We illustrate the optimal design strategies in Fig. 5 ac-
cording to the heterogeneous security requirements and link
creation costs ratio.
2) Robust Optimal Strategy: One interesting phenomenon
is that some strategies are optimal for a class of security
requirements. Thus, these strategies are robust in spite of the
dynamics of cyber threat levels. We summarize the results in
the following Corollary.
Corollary 4. Consider to design a (k1, k2)-resistant IoT
network. If sDn−1 is the optimal strategy, then it is robust and
optimal to security requirement for the network being (k′1, k
′
2)-
resistant, for all k′1 > k1 and all k
′
2 > k2. If s
D
n2−1 is the
optimal strategy, then it is robust and optimal to cyber threat
Regime I
Regime II
Fig. 5: Optimal design of two-layer IoT networks in two regimes
in terms of system parameters. When k2 > k1, the optimal network
design follows from the strategies in regime I which can be in any
sDn−1, sDn2−1 or s
D
0 depending on the value of
cP
cNP
. When k2 = k1,
the IoT network designer chooses strategies from regime II, either of
sDn−1 or sD0 in term of the link cost ratio
cP
cNP
.
levels (k1, k′2), for all k
′
2 > k2. Furthermore, the optimal
strategy sD0 is not robust to any other security standards
(k′1, k
′
2), for k
′
1 6= k1 and k′2 6= k2.
Corollary 4 has a natural understanding on the selection
of robust strategies. When the cyber threat level increases,
then the optimal network sDn−1 remains to be optimal since
the network construction cost does not increase under sDn−1.
Under the optimal sDn2−1, subnetwork 2 is connected with all
protected links and the rest is connected by a Harary network
with the minimum cost. If subnetwork 2 faces more attacks,
(k2 becomes larger), then sDn2−1 is robust and optimal in the
sense that subnetwork 2 remains secure and no other non-
protected link is required.
3) Construction of the Optimal Secure IoT Networks: We
present the constructive methods of optimal IoT networks with
parameters in different regimes based on Proposition 3.
Specifically, the optimal sDn−1 can be constructed by any
tree network using protected links. In addition, the optimal
networks sDn2−1 can be constructed in two steps as follows.
First, we create a tree protected network on the nodes of S2.
Then, we construct a (k1 + 1)-Harary network on the nodes
of S1 ∪ {n1 + 1}, i.e., all nodes of type 1 and one node of
type 2, where a constructive method of Harary network can
be found in [36].
Finally, regarding the optimal network sD0 , we build it
with the following procedure. First, we renumber the nodes
according to the sequence: 1, 2, ..., k1+12 , n2,
k1+1
2 +1, ..., k1+
1, n2 + 1, k1 + 2, ..., 3
k1+1
2 , n2 + 2, ... Recall that this renum-
bering sequence can be achieved by interpolating one node in
S2 after every k1+12 nodes in S1. Then, we build a (k1 + 1)-
Harary network among all the nodes in S1 and S2. Finally,
we construct a (k2 − k1)-Harary network on the nodes in S2.
4) Consideration of Random Link Failures: In the con-
sidered model so far, the non-protected communication link
between nodes is removed with probability 1 by the attack
and remains connected without attack. In general, the non-
protected links face random natural failures. If we consider
this random failure factor, then there is a probability that the
designed optimal network will be disconnected under the joint
cyber attacks and failures. We assume perfect connection of
protected links and denote the random failure probability of
a non-protected link by κ ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, in the regime
that the optimal network design is of Harary network where
all links are non-protected, then under the anticipated level
of cyber attacks, a single link failure of non-protected link
will result in the network disconnection. Thus, the probability
of network connection, i.e., mean connectivity, is equal to
(1 − κ)
⌈
n1(k1+1)+n2(k2+1)
2
⌉
−k2 ≈ (1 − κ)n1(k1+1)+n2(k2+1)−2k22
which is of order (1−κ)n1k1+n2k22 . Similarly, under the regime
that the optimal network admits n2 − 1 protected links and⌈
(k1+1)(n1+1)
2
⌉
non-protected links, the probability of network
connection under link failure is (1− κ)
⌈
(k1+1)(n1+1)
2
⌉
≈ (1−
κ)
(k1+1)(n1+1)
2 which is of order (1−κ) k1n12 . We can see that in
the above two regimes, when the security requirement is not
relatively high and the size of the network is not large, the
current designed optimal strategy gives a relatively high mean
network connectivity. In the regime that the optimal network
is constructed with all protected links, then the mean network
connectivity is 1 where the random failure effect is removed.
IV. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we use case studies of IoBT to illustrate
the optimal design principals of secure networks with het-
erogeneous components. The results in this section are also
applicable to other mission-critical IoT network applications.
The IoBT network designer determines the optimal strategy
on creating links with/without protection between agents in
the battlefield. The ground layer and aerial layer in IoBT
generally face different levels of cyber threats which aim
to disrupt the network communications. Since UAVs become
more powerful in the military tasks, they are the primal
targets of the attackers, and hence the UAV network faces
an increasing number of cyber threats. In the following case
studies, we investigate the scenario that the IoBT network
designer anticipates more cyber attacks on the UAV network
than the soldier and UGV networks. The cost ratio between
forming a protected link and a unprotected link cpcNP is critical
in designing the optimal IoBT network. This ratio depends on
the number of channels used in creating a safe link though
MTD. We will analyze various cases in the following studies.
A. Optimal IoBT Network Design
Consider an IoBT network consisting of n1 = 20 soldiers
and n2 = 5 UAVs (n = 25). The designer aims to design
the ground network and the UAV network resistant to k1 =
5 and k2 = 9 attacks, respectively. Hence the global IoBT
network is (5, 9)-resistant. Based on Proposition 3, the system
parameters satisfy the condition of regime I. Further, we have
two critical points T1 := (k1 +1+ k1+1n1 )/2 = 3.15 and T2 :=
(k2 + 1 +
k2−k1
n2−1 )/2 = 5.5, at which the topology of optimal
IoBT network encounters a switching. For example, when a
protected link adopts 3 channels to prevent from attacks, i.e.,
cp
cNP
= 3, the optimal IoBT network is an sD24 graph as shown
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Fig. 6: (a) When cp
cNP
= 3 < T1, the optimal IoBT network is an sD24
graph with all protected links. (b) When T1 <
cp
cNP
= 5 < T2, the
optimal network is an sD4 graph, where the UAV network is connected
with protected links and the ground network with all unprotected
links. (c) When cp
cNP
= 7 > T3, the optimal IoBT network adopts
an sD0 configuration with all unprotected links.
in Fig. 6(a). When a protected link requires 5 channels to
be perfectly secure, i.e., cpcNP = 5, then the optimal IoBT
network is of sD4 configuration which is depicted in Fig. 6(b).
In addition, if the cyber attacks are difficult to defend against
(e.g., require 7 channels to keep a link safe, i.e., cpcNP = 7),
the optimal IoBT network becomes an sD0 graph as shown in
Fig. 6(c). The above three types of optimal networks indicate
that the smaller the cost of a protected link is, the more secure
connections are formed starting from the UAV network to the
ground network.
B. Resilience of the IoBT Network
The numbers of UAVs, UGVs and soldiers can be dy-
namically changing. To study the resilience of the designed
UAV network
UGV/Soldier network
Protected link
Unprotected link
Two soldiers joining in
UAV network
UGV/Soldier network
Two soldiers joining in
Zoom-in topology
Rewired links
(a)
UAV network
UGV/Soldier network
3 soldiers leaving
(b)
Fig. 7: (a) and (b) show the optimal IoBT network reconfiguration
when two UGVs/soldiers join in and leave the battlefield, respectively.
network, we first investigate the scenario that a number of
UGVs/soldiers join the battlefield which can be seen as army
backups. As n1 increases, the threshold T1 decreases slightly
while T2 remains unchanged. Therefore, the optimal IoBT
network keeps with a similar topology except that the newly
joined UGVs/soldiers connect to a set of their neighbors.
To illustrate this scenario, we present the optimal network
with n1 = 22 and
cp
cNP
= 5 in Fig. 7(a), and all the other
parameters stay the same as those in Section IV-A. When
n1 decreases, the network remains almost unchanged except
those UGVs/soldiers losing communication links build up
new connections with neighbors. An illustrative example with
n1 = 17 is depicted in Fig. 7(b).
Another interesting scenario is that when the number of
UAVs n2 changes due to backup aerial vehicles joining in
and current vehicles leaving the battlefield for maintenance.
When n2 increases, then the threshold T1 remains the same
while T2 decreases. If the cost ratio
cp
cNP
lies in the same
regime with respect to T1 and T2 even though T2 decreases,
then under cpcNP ≤ T2, the newly joined UAV will connect
with another UAV with a protected link which either creates
an SDn−1 or s
D
n2−1 graph. Otherwise, if
cp
cNP
> T2, the UAV
first connects to other UAVs and then connects to a set of
UGVs/soldiers both with unprotected links which yields an sD0
graph. When a number of UAVs leaving the battlefield, i.e., n2,
decreases, then T1 stays the same and T2 will increase under
which the cost ratio cpcNP previous belonging to interval
cp
cNP
≥
T2 may change to interval T1 ≤ cpcNP ≤ T2. Note that regime
switching can also happen when n2 increases. Therefore, the
optimal IoBT network switches from sD0 to s
D
n2−1 (for the
increase of n2 case, the switching is in a backward direction).
For example, when the network contains n2 = 6 UAVs and
cp
cNP
= 5.4, and the other parameters are the same as those in
Section IV-A, from Proposition 3, the optimal IoBT network
is an sD0 graph. However, Fig. 6(b) shows that the optimal
network adopts an sD4 topology when n2 = 5. Therefore, by
adding a UAV to the aerial layer, the optimal IoBT network
switches from sD4 to s
D
0 in this scenario. The interpretation is
that a smaller number of UAVs is easier for the aerial network
to defend against attacks, and hence protected links are used
between UAVs instead of redundant unprotected links.
C. Flexible Design and Robust Strategies
In this section, we further investigate the secure IoBT
network design in the presence of varying levels of cyber
threats. Specifically, the parameters are selected as follows:
n1 = 20, n2 = 10, k1 = 5, and cPcNP = 5. The security
requirement k2 takes a value varying from 5 to 14, modeling
the dynamic or uncertain behaviors of the attacker targeting at
the critical UAV network. The optimal IoBT network design is
depicted in Fig. 8, and the corresponding cost is in shown Fig.
9. When k2 ∈ J5, 8K, the optimal IoBT network is constructed
with all non-protected links. Since k2 becomes larger, the
number of non-protected links used is increasing, and thus the
total cost increases. The optimal network topology switches
from sD0 to s
D
9 when k2 exceeds the threshold 8. Then, when
k2 ∈ J9, 14K, the optimal IoBT network is unchanged as well
as the associated construction cost. Despite the increases in
k2, no addition links are required since the UAV network
(subnetwork 2) is connected with all protected links. Note that
sD9 is a robust strategy in the sense that the IoBT network
can be (5, k2)-resistant, for all k2 ∈ J9, 14K. This study can
be generalized to the cases when the network designer has an
uncertain belief on the attacker’s strategy. Therefore, the IoBT
designer can prepare for a number of attacking scenarios and
choose from these designed strategies in the field with a timely
and flexible manner.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have studied a two-layer secure network
formation problem for IoT networks in which the network
designer aims to form a two-layer communication network
with heterogeneous security requirements while minimizing
the cost of using protected and unprotected links. We have
shown a lower bound on the number of non-protected links
of the optimal network and developed a method to construct
networks that satisfy the heterogeneous network design speci-
fications. We have demonstrated the design methodology in the
IoBT networks. It has been shown that the optimal network
can reconfigure itself adaptively as nodes enter or leave the
system. In addition, the optimal IoBT network configuration
may encounter a topological switching when the number of
UAVs changes. We have further identified the optimal design
strategies that can be robust to a set of security requirements.
As part of the future work, we would extend the single network
designer problem to a two-player one, where each player
designs their own subnetwork in a decentralized way. Another
direction will be generalizing the current bi-level network to
more than two layers and designing the optimal strategies.
Fig. 8: Optimal IoBT network design with parameters n1 = 20,
n2 = 10, k1 = 5, cPcNP = 5, and k2 taking a value from 5 to 14.
When k2 ∈ J5, 8K, the optimal network design is in the form of sD0 .
When k2 ∈ J9, 14K, the optimal network admits a strategy of sD9 .
Note that sD9 is robust to a dynamic or varying number of cyber
attacks ranging from 9 to 14.
Fig. 9: The total cost of optimal network design in terms of the
number of non-protected links. In the regime of k2 ∈ J5, 8K, with
a larger k2, the IoBT network requires more non-protected links
to be resistant to attacks. In the regime of k2 ∈ J9, 14K, the total
cost remains the same, since the UAV network is connected with
all protected links and no additional non-protected link is required
despite of the increasing cyber threats k2.
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